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RETHINKING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM TITLE 
IX AFTER OBERGEFELL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since same-sex marriage was legalized nationally in 
the United States in Obergefell v. Hodges, the media has drawn 
attention to a related issue facing the LGBT community: 
discrimination in higher education.1 Educational institutions 
that receive federal aid, or admit students who receive federal 
aid, are required to comply with Title IX, a federal statute that 
prohibits sex discrimination.2 In recent years, case law has 
included “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in the 
definition of “sex” under Title IX, and therefore under the 
umbrella of Title IX protections.3 
Title IX exempts religious educational institutions from 
compliance with all of its requirements to protect First 
Amendment rights.4 This religious exemption means that 
religious educational institutions are legally permitted to 
discriminate based on sex (now including sexual orientation 
and gender identity). However, the actual process of granting 
and applying religious exemptions, based on current Title IX 
law, is complicated and uncertain. This has led many to ask if 
the current system for religious exemptions from Title IX is 
actually working effectively at protecting the rights of all 
people, including those who identify as part of the LGBT 
community.5 
This Note explores the current laws and procedures for 
 
 1 Sarah Warbelow & Remington Gregg, Hidden Discrimination: Title IX 
Religious Exemptions Putting LGBT Students at Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 
2015), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/Title_IX_Exemptions_Report.pdf. 
 2 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
 3 Title IX Protections from Bullying and Harassment in Schools: FAQs for 
LGBT or Gender Nonconforming Students and Their Families, NATIONAL WOMEN’S 
LAW CENTER (Oct. 2012), https://nwlc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/lgbt_bullying_title_ix_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 4 20 U.S.C. § 1687. 
 5 Warbelow & Gregg, supra note 1. 
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granting religious exemptions under Title IX and evaluates 1) 
whether they are working effectively and 2) if not, how they 
could be improved to protect the rights of both religious groups 
and LGBT students. Part II lays out the current law and 
guidelines which specify how to obtain religious exemptions, 
the application of these guidelines over time, and how they 
have been applied to sexual orientation specifically. Part III 
examines similar types of legislation that have attempted to 
forge a compromise between religious freedoms and protections 
for LGBT individuals, including language from the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”), the so-called 
“Utah Compromise,” and anti-discrimination statutes in 
California. Part IV compares the Title IX regulations explained 
in Part II to the language in the employment discrimination 
statutes described in Part III, in order to 1) identify problems 
within the system for granting religious exemptions to 
educational institutions and to 2) propose solutions to these 
problems by drawing upon other proposed and enacted statutes 
which balanced protections for both religious and LGBT 
communities. 
II. TITLE IX REGULATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
Congress passed Title IX in 1972 as part of the Higher 
Education Amendments to prevent sex discrimination in higher 
education in the United States.6 First, this Part will explore the 
actual language of Title IX, including both the statutory 
language prohibiting sex discrimination and the “unpublished” 
language that explains which schools are entitled to a religious 
exemption from Title IX and how they may obtain said 
exemption. Then it will describe how this language has been 
received over time and how it has impacted the granting of 
religious exemptions. Finally, it will investigate how these 
religious exemptions are actually granted today, especially in 
the context of sexual orientation. 
A. Title IX Language 
Title IX explicitly states that no person shall be subjected to 
any form of discrimination on the basis of sex “under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
 
 6 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
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assistance.”7 The statute also outlines an exception to this 
clause: an educational institution is exempt when 1) it is 
“controlled by a religious organization,” and 2) prohibiting sex 
discrimination “would not be consistent with the religious 
tenets of such [controlling] organization.”8 
To determine when an educational institution is “controlled 
by a religious organization” for the purpose of the exemption, 
the government agency charged with Title IX enforcement—the 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”)—developed a “control test” for 
internal use by OCR employees.9 Note that a religious 
educational institution need meet only one of these 
requirements to be considered to have a controlling religious 
organization. The test states that an educational institution is 
considered to be controlled by a religious organization when 1) 
it is a “school or department of divinity,” 2) it “requires its 
faculty, students or employees to be members of or otherwise 
espouse a personal belief in, the religion of the [controlling] 
organization,” or 3) its “charter . . . contains explicit statements 
that it is controlled by a religious organization” or it is 
“committed to the doctrines of a particular religion, the 
members of its governing body are appointed by the controlling 
religious organization, and it receives a significant amount of 
financial support from the controlling religious organization.”10 
Note that a religious educational institution need meet only 
one of these requirements to be considered to have a controlling 
religious organization. 
This test originated in 1977 and has remained an internal 
policy.11 Additionally, OCR employees who worked with 
religious exemptions and Title IX were instructed not to 
contact the purported controlling organizations because this 
would be considered “too obtrusive” in gathering information 
(most likely in response to First Amendment complaints).12 
OCR treated the control test as a guideline rather than an 
 
 7 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 8 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3). 
 9 Assurance of Compliance with Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 42 
Fed. Reg. 15,141, 15,142–43 (Mar. 18, 1977), 
https://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/fedreg/fr042/fr042053/fr042053.pdf. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 KAN. L. REV. 327, 
371–74 (2016). 
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actual rule.13 
An internal OCR policy set forth a procedure by which an 
educational institution could claim an exemption, stating that 
it 1) “shall do so by submitting in writing to the Director a 
statement by the highest ranking official of the institution” in 
which it 2) identifies the specific provisions of Title IX which 
“conflict with a specific tenet of the [controlling] religious 
organization.”14 Note that this policy specifically uses the word 
“claim” rather than the words “apply for,” as well as the fact 
that the educational institution must specifically identify 
which aspect of Title IX (“sex,” i.e. pregnancy status, sexual 
orientation, etc.) conflicts with a specific tenet of the 
institution’s controlling religious organization. 
B. History and Criticism of Title IX Regulations 
The actual procedure for granting exemptions differs 
greatly from what one might intuit from the statutory 
language. First, the historical application of the religious 
exemption’s language suggests that there is some ambiguity as 
to whether a religious educational institution is entitled to an 
exemption simply by virtue of being a religious educational 
institution (i.e. the exemption is self-executed), or whether it is 
a constitutional right of OCR to require an application or proof 
of claim prior to recognizing a religious exemption. Second, a 
controlling organization is not really required. Third, an 
explanation of a conflict between specific Title IX provisions 
and specific tenets of the controlling religious organization is 
not really required, nor is there any investigation into the 
sincerity of the particular tenets put forth by the educational 
institution. 
There has been a long-standing battle between religious 
educational institutions and OCR over the constitutionality of 
the regulations and guidelines controlling religious exemptions 
from Title IX requirements. As early as 1975, the American 
Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and 
Universities (“AAPICU”) and the U.S. Catholic Conference 
claimed that having to apply for an exemption and be 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities 
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,139 (June 
4, 1975). 
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evaluated by the government for eligibility was a violation of 
the First Amendment on grounds of excessive government 
entanglement with religion.15 The AAPICU suggested OCR 
withdraw its Title IX claim procedure altogether and remove 
any requirement that a religious institution must claim an 
exemption or otherwise contact the government.16 The U.S. 
Catholic Conference suggested a similar, less radical, proposal: 
a self-certification procedure, in which the educational 
institutions simply notify OCR that they would be claiming a 
religious exemption from all or part of Title IX.17 
OCR essentially adopted the U.S. Catholic Conference’s 
self-certification suggestion from this point forward, though not 
formally. Over two hundred claims were submitted to OCR by 
various religious institutions over the next ten years, but OCR 
did not respond to any of them.18 Then, in 1985, OCR took on 
the massive task of responding to all of these claims within the 
next nine months.19 Regional offices were instructed to use a 
highly deferential standard of review, to the point that OCR 
did not deny a single religious exemption request, and OCR 
made little effort to review claims.20 
Although religious exemptions have been controversial and 
contested even by the educational institutions themselves, very 
few students or employees have challenged an educational 
institution’s eligibility for a Title IX exemption. One of the 
exceptions is Petruska v. Gannon University, where a female 
who was formerly a chaplain at a Catholic university claimed 
that she was demoted and discharged because of her sex.21 She 
had originally filed a claim under Title VII, and then amended 
 
 15 Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Postsecondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 
(1975); Review of Regulations to Implement Title IX of Public Law 92–138 Conducted 
Pursuant to Sec. 431 of the General Education Provisions Act, 228 et seq, 588–91 (U.S. 
GPO, Washington, 1975). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Ernest L. Wilkinson, Leonard J. Arrington & Bruce C. Hafen, Brigham Young 
University: The First One Hundred Years 309–10 (vol. 4, 1976). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12. 
 21 Amanda Bryk, Title IX Giveth and the Religious Exemption Taketh Away: 
How the Religious Exemption Eviscerates the Protection Afforded Transgender Students 
Under Title IX, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 778–79 (2015); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 
F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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to include a Title IX claim as well.22 The district court held that 
her claim was barred by the “ministerial exception” under the 
First Amendment.23 In order for courts to determine whether 
an employee qualifies for a ministerial exception, the court 
must use a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, based 
primarily on the individual’s job description and function.24 So 
while she might have had a valid claim under Title IX had it 
been a different position of employment or had she been a 
student, the court held that because the position in question 
was a ministerial position, and because the ministerial 
exception extended beyond the reach of Title VII to also apply 
to Title IX—because it is a broad right guaranteed under the 
First Amendment—she did not have a valid claim in this 
particular case. This case demonstrates that 1) the ministerial 
exception applies to Title IX, and 2) a religious educational 
institution may receive a religious exemption to Title IX after a 
discrimination suit is filed. 
In fact, there are multiple examples of religious educational 
institutions claiming a religious exemption after a Title IX 
claim has already been brought against them.25 At George Fox 
University (“GFU”), a Quaker institution, a transgender 
student brought a Title IX claim against the university for 
refusing to allow him to live in the all-male dormitory on 
campus.26 After receiving this claim, GFU applied to OCR for a 
religious exemption based on a conflict between 
accommodating transgender students and its religious tenets 
and received an exemption for its policies pertaining to campus 
housing, restrooms, locker rooms, and athletics.27 This is not to 
say that a case could not be successful if brought against a 
religious educational institution for violation of Title IX prior to 
the school claiming a religious exemption, but this sort of 
challenge has not yet occurred. Thus far, in all Title IX cases 
involving religious exemptions, the courts have presumed that 
a religious exemption is automatically granted if the institution 
 
 22 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 
171, 172 (2012). 
 25 See Letter from Thomas E. Corts, President, Samford University to Assistant 
Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., c/o Mr. Archie B. Meyer, Sr., Regional Civil Rights Dir., Office for 
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 29, 1992). 
 26 Bryk, supra note 21, at 755. 
 27 Id. 
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meets the requirements, regardless of whether it has claimed 
or applied for an exemption. 
C. Application of Title IX 
Perhaps even more important than understanding the 
objections to religious exemptions under Title IX is 
understanding how the language itself has been consistently 
applied to educational institutions over time. Not a single 
educational institution has ever been denied a religious 
exemption from Title IX.28 There have been requests for more 
information, a lack of response, and withdrawn applications; 
but, never has OCR contacted an educational institution to 
inform it that it did not meet the requirements for a religious 
exemption.29 As mentioned above, there are two major 
requirements that an educational institution must fulfill 
according to OCR’s policy language: passing the control test 
and providing the specific religious tenets which conflict with 
the specific Title IX regulations.30 
The control test has been applied very loosely. For example, 
between 1975 and 1977, fifty-three Orthodox Jewish 
educational institutions claimed the exemption, but did not list 
a controlling organization in their claim.31 In simply stating 
that they were religious institutions, OCR recognized each of 
the fifty-three claims.32 Similarly, in 1985, an un-affiliated 
Christian school, Berea College, claimed its Board of Trustees 
as its controlling religious organization. OCR agreed and 
granted the religious exemption.33 In fact, many Christian 
schools did not identify a particular controlling religious 
organization, using instead their Board of Directors or Board of 
Trustees, statement of faith, or other type of justification to 
receive their exemption.34 When schools explicitly stated that 
they did not have a controlling religious organization, OCR 
 
 28 Warbelow & Gregg, supra note 1. 
 29 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12, at 374–75. 
 30 See supra part II.A. 
 31 Id. at 368–69. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for 
Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., to John B. Stephenson, President, Berea Coll. 1 (Sept. 3, 
1985), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/berea-college-
response-09031985.pdf. 
 34 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12, at 369. 
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sought additional information to essentially posit a controlling 
religious organization.35 Interestingly, OCR began using the 
words “grant” and “request” with increasing frequency 
beginning in 1975.36 
Second, the requirement of identifying specific religious 
tenets which conflict with Title IX has also been ignored in 
many circumstances. The Orthodox Jewish schools mentioned 
above were vague about what their religious tenets were and 
how they conflicted with Title IX. The schools also claimed that 
the First Amendment excused them from having to meet any of 
the requirements set by OCR.37 The OCR then provided them 
with an exemption.38  
Similarly, Spring Arbor University, affiliated with the Free 
Methodist Church, relied on its mission statement rather than 
on Bible verses—a common practice among other religious 
universities—to show that accommodation of transgender 
students was inconsistent with the university’s religious 
tenets.39 Again, OCR granted the religious exemption.40 
Additionally, OCR never inquired into the sincerity of religious 
beliefs or whether they are actually practiced by the controlling 
religious organization (or claimed religious affiliate).41 While in 
theory the government may examine the sincerity with which 
claimants hold to their religious beliefs (in determining 
whether an educational institution is eligible for a religious 
Title IX exemption), some suggest this is not really possible in 
practice.42 Additionally, OCR had received many past 
complaints about infringing upon First Amendment rights with 
its claim procedure, and likely was wary about doing anything 
 
 35 See Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to James A. Fischer, President, Kenrick Seminary 1 (Aug. 1, 1985), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/kenrick-seminary-
response-08011985.pdf. 
 36 Letter from William S. Barker, President, Covenant Theological Seminary to 
Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights 3 (Feb. 23, 1983). 
 37 Memorandum re Title IX Religious Exemptions from Harry M. Singleton, 
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. to Reg’l Dirs., Regions I–X, Office for 
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Aug. 2, 1985), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/singleton-memo-19850802.pdf. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Bryk, supra note 21, at 781. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 778. 
 42 See Frederick Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why 
They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94–151 
(2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657733. 
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that might cause more backlash from religious groups and 
educational institutions.43 
In the history of the application of the Title IX religious 
exemption, there are inconsistent opinions about the need to 
apply for or a right to claim a religious exemption, a general 
lack of investigation into the existence of a controlling religious 
organization, and a consistent ignorance on the part of OCR as 
to which specific tenets religious schools claim conflict with 
which Title IX regulations. This is a somewhat short history, 
because Title IX was passed in 1972, but its importance 
continues to increase as LGBT issues come to the forefront of 
the public eye. 
D. Application of Title IX to Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination 
As mentioned above, the definition of “sex” in the context of 
Title IX has been broadened to include discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy status, abortion, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, and others.44 Sexual orientation was officially included 
as part of the definition of “sex” under Title IX less than a year 
ago, based on a ruling in a California District Court in Videckis 
v. Pepperdine University, when two lesbian students who were 
dismissed from the basketball team and university sued under 
Title IX.45 Leading up to and after the landmark Obergefell 
decision, there has been a sharp increase in requests by 
religious educational institutions for exemptions from the Title 
IX protections based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.46 In fact, for a span of ten years between 2003 and 
2013, there was an average of only one claim for a religious 
exemption per year.47 That number spiked in 2013, with fifty-
seven claims in a span of two years, starting with the Arcadia 
School District’s request based on a complaint by a transgender 
 
 43 Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Postsecondary Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 409 
(1975). 
 44 Title IX Protections from Bullying and Harassment in Schools, supra note 3. 
 45 Videckis v. Pepperdine University, 100 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 46 Augustine-Adams, supra note 12. 
 47 Resolution Agreement between the Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist., the U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. (July 
24, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/07/26/arcadiaagree.pdf. 
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student.48 All but one of these fifty-seven claims specified 
gender identity and/or sexual orientation as the reason for 
their exemption.49 
Obviously religious educational institutions may request an 
exemption to any part of Title IX, but this Note focuses on 
statutes which prohibit sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity discrimination in order to better understand and 
suggest improvements to the current Title IX religious 
exemption regulations. While the solutions proposed here will 
protect those who are discriminated against based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, it will also improve the system 
for anyone who is entitled to protection under Title IX. 
III. ENDA, THE UTAH COMPROMISE, AND FEHA 
This Note seeks to parse out the weaknesses of the 
language and application of Title IX religious exemptions, as 
well as propose solutions to those weaknesses, by finding and 
comparing similar statutes aimed at the same goal: balancing 
religious freedom with necessary protection for LGBT 
individuals. This Part explores the recent changes in various 
employment and other non-discrimination laws that now 
include sexual orientation as a protected class. First, this Part 
will look at the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(“ENDA”), which the legislature introduced as a bill in every 
Congress but one from 1994 to 2013 and which would have 
created federal employment non-discrimination protections 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Second, this 
Part will look at the so-called “Utah Compromise,” a state law 
enacted in 2015 that increased religious freedom protections 
while also providing employment and housing protections 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Then third, it 
will examine the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) 
enacted in California, which is one of the longest-standing 
pieces of legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. 
A. ENDA 
ENDA, though never passed by Congress, represents a 
 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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years-long effort by lawmakers to reach a nationwide 
compromise between LGBT and religious communities to 
ensure that the freedoms and liberties of all Americans are 
protected in a way that is as fair and just as possible.50 ENDA 
can serve as a partial model for updating Title IX religious 
exemption language and applications, especially since it would 
have amended Title VII, which is often referred to as a 
synonymous standard with Title IX.51 
First, this Subpart will lay out the basic language of ENDA, 
as well as the language found in Title VII, with regard to 
religious exemptions in the specific context of education. Then, 
this Subpart will evaluate the differing perspectives on ENDA 
and why it was ultimately retired for good, largely due to 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.52 Finally, this Subpart will 
briefly discuss how identical language has been applied in 
certain states and how that has impacted the protection of 
religious freedoms and LGBT individuals in those states.  
1. Language of ENDA 
The ENDA language discussed in this Note will be that of 
the most recent bill proposed in 2013 to the 113th Congress. 
While the bill did not pass Congress, several states adopted the 
exact language of ENDA, including Delaware and Nevada, the 
two states this Note will address.53 The basic purpose of ENDA 
was to “prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.”54 The actual language of 
the bill encompassed failing or refusing to hire, firing, or 
otherwise discriminating against any employee because of his 
or her “actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender 
identity.”55 
Just as in Title IX, an exemption is provided for religious 
organizations in ENDA’s text, as well as specific 
acknowledgement of religious educational institutions in that 
 
 50 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). 
 51 Goodman v. Archbishop Curley High Sch., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Md. 
2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. CV RDB-15-0627, 2016 WL 3906640 (D. Md. 
July 19, 2016) (holding that in evaluating Title IX claims, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit looks to case law interpreting Title VII). 
 52 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014). 
 53 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West). 
 54 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, supra, note 50. 
 55 Id. 
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exemption. ENDA states that the entirety of the Act shall not 
apply to any organization or “educational institution or 
institution of learning” that is already exempt from the 
religious discrimination provisions of Title VII.56 This would 
ensure that not only are religious exemptions already provided 
for educational institutions under Title VII, but that they are 
explicitly also acknowledged in reference to sexual orientation. 
The Title VII language on religious exemptions works as a 
different version of the “control test” mentioned above under 
Title IX, and it even refers specifically to educational 
institutions. In describing educational institutions, Title VII 
includes a longer list than Title IX of the types of institutions 
that might be eligible for an exemption, including a “school, 
college, university, or other educational institution or 
institution of learning.”57 The Title VII control test requires 
that the educational institution 1) must be “in whole or in part, 
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular 
religion” or religious organization, or 2) must have a 
curriculum “directed toward the propagation of a particular 
religion.”58 
The other language in Title VII, which defines “religious 
employer” for purposes of applying the religious exemption 
under ENDA, states that an exemption is granted to those 
religious organizations (including educational institutions) in 
the employment of individuals who adhere to the particular 
religion of their organization and are performing work 
“connected with the carrying on” of the religious organization.59 
This language applies to anyone who might receive a religious 
exemption when it comes to employment law, not just 
institutions of higher education, and suggests that when an 
employee of a religious organization is performing work which 
by its nature requires him or her to be of that particular faith, 
the organization is exempt from Title VII with regard to that 
individual’s employment status. 
2. Criticism of ENDA 
There were several specific criticisms of ENDA which 
 
 56 Id. at § 6. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
 58 Id. 
 59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). 
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helped lead to its ultimate demise before Congress scrapped it 
entirely. Conservatives and religious groups tended to be the 
most likely to criticize ENDA, whereas those who supported 
increased protection for the LGBT community were largely 
supportive of ENDA. 
For example, the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops critiqued ENDA on five grounds: 
1) Lack of an exception for a “bona fide occupational 
qualification” (“BFOQ”) which exists under every other 
category of discrimination under Title VII except for 
race; 
2) Lack of a distinction between homosexual inclination and 
conduct; 
3) Support for redefinition of marriage; 
4) Protection of “gender identity” allows individuals to 
select their own sex in opposition with their biological 
sex at birth; and 
5) Religious liberty could be threatened by punishing the 
religious or moral disapproval of same-sex conduct while 
protecting only certain religious employers (i.e. 
protecting only those who are part of an actual religious 
organization, rather than religious individuals 
operating businesses unrelated to their religious 
beliefs).60  
These points reflect concerns that likely would have been 
held by many other religious freedom groups. When looking at 
all of the critiques together, it appears that the overarching 
concern was a threat of losing control over their own 
organizations and the right to exclude (other than the 
redefinition of marriage, which now would no longer be 
relevant in light of Obergefell).61 Also, the concern that 
religious individuals who run businesses unrelated to religion 
would not be protected was well founded. Once the Supreme 
Court issued the Hobby Lobby decision, LGBT advocacy and 
liberal groups pulled out their support of ENDA.62 
 
 60 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Questions and Answers About 
the Employee Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-
life-and-dignity/labor-employment/upload/enda-backgrounder-2013.pdf (last visited 
May 11, 2016). 
 61 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2588 (2015). 
 62 Jennifer Bendery & Amanda Terkel, Gay Rights Groups Pull Support for 
ENDA Over Sweeping Religious Exemption, THE HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2014, 8:28 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/08/enda-religious-
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In fact, initially many LGBT advocacy and liberal groups 
supported ENDA, including the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the Transgender Law Center, 
and Lambda Legal, but these groups abandoned support after 
Hobby Lobby.63 This ruling held that the sincerely held 
religious beliefs of a corporation’s owners are properly 
attributed to the corporation as a whole.64 ENDA (and Title 
VII) exemptions for religious corporations, associations, 
educational institutions, or societies could then potentially 
exempt any non-religious corporation or entity whose owners 
held sincere religious beliefs from protections based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity, leaving the exemption much 
broader than originally intended. 
Now ENDA is no longer an option for federal protections in 
employment based on sexual orientation and gender identity, 
mostly because Hobby Lobby broadened the exemptions 
included in the bill to the point that the effect of the bill itself 
completely changed. While this led to disapproval from both 
sides, the removal of ENDA as a viable option for protecting 
both religious and LGBT groups has opened the door to 
creating an entirely new, and possibly better, solution. 
3. Application of ENDA 
While Congress never enacted ENDA, both Nevada and 
Delaware have “control tests” for higher education religious 
exemptions identical to ENDA’s control test.65 In 2002, when 
ENDA was still under consideration, some were concerned that 
caseloads would increase.66 However, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that the case load for the Employment 
Opportunity Commission would only rise by 5 to 7% as a result 
of ENDA.67 This was confirmed by the results in Delaware and 
Nevada, where caseloads increased only minimally, based on a 
 
exemption_n_5568736.html. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2754 (2014). 
 65 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 
815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). 
 66 23 No. 12 Ind. Emp. L. Letter 4. 
 67 CBO Cost Estimate: S. 1284 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2002, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (June 13, 2002), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/13753. 
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lack of cases on record. 
Delaware included sexual orientation as a protected class in 
various non-discrimination laws, enacted the language of 
ENDA’s “control test” for higher education in 2009, and added 
gender identity in 2013.68 This included discrimination in 
employment, housing, public accommodations, and other 
areas.69 Nevada added a prohibition of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in employment and public accommodations 
in 1999, and added gender identity in 2011.70 In Delaware and 
Nevada, both of which have language identical to ENDA’s with 
regard to higher education, there are not any recorded cases 
brought which challenge the religious exemption statute, nor 
even any discrimination claims based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity at all.71 
This lack of contesting the religious exemption 
requirement/control test language that was identical to ENDA 
might show that the protections are working how they should 
and are balancing religious liberties and LGBT protections in a 
way that works for nearly everyone. It might also indicate a 
lack of knowledge on the part of the general public, and 
particularly of young students, of their right to protection and 
the requirements that a school must meet in order to be 
exempt from these requirements so as to have the “right” to 
differentiate against them. 
B. The Utah Compromise 
The Utah Compromise was a ground-breaking piece of 
legislation, mostly because Utah, which is headquarters to The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“the LDS 
Church”), has historically been a very conservative and anti-
gay state.72 The LDS Church worked with legislators to help 
 
 68 S.B. 121, 145th Gen. Ct. (Del. 2009). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Ed Vogel, Sandoval signs transgender job discrimination bill, LAS VEGAS 
REVIEW JOURNAL (May 24, 2011, 1:39 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/government/sandoval-signs-transgender-job-
discrimination-bill (last visited May 11, 2016). 
 71 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 711 (West); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 613.330 (West); 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 613.350 (West); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 
815, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). 
 72 Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Utah “Compromise” 
to Protect LGBT Citizens from Discrimination is No Model for the Nation, SLATE (Mar. 
18, 2015, 3:18 PM), 
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develop a bill that would protect religious freedom while also 
expanding protection to LGBT individuals in employment and 
housing.73 First, this Subpart will explore the language of the 
bill. It will then examine the support and criticism that the 
Utah Compromise has received from various groups. Finally, it 
will explore the actual application of this new legislation and 
how it has impacted the people of Utah.  
1. Language of the Utah Compromise 
The “Utah Compromise” was a modification of the current 
Utah Antidiscrimination and Fair Housing Acts (“the Acts”). 
Both “gender identity” and “sexual orientation” were added to 
the lists of protected classes (race, gender, etc.) in the Acts. 
This meant that both sexual orientation and gender identity 
were “prohibited bases for discrimination in employment” as 
well as in housing, though not considered protected classes in 
general or in other legal contexts.74 
Prior to these modifications, the Acts already had a unique 
way of providing a substitute for a “religious exemption” to 
religious groups. Instead of having a section detailing which 
organizations qualify for a religious exemption, as ENDA did 
and most other states do, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act 
simply excluded religious groups from the definition of 
“employer” altogether.75 The Utah Compromise added 
additional exemptions from the definition of “employer” and 
therefore increased the number of persons and entities not 
subject to anti-discrimination laws.76  
The current language of the Utah Antidiscrimination Act—
after the passage of the amendments listed in the Utah 
Compromise—excludes the following from the definition of 
“employer”: 1) any religious organization or religious 
educational institution, including any religious leader “when 
that individual is acting in the capacity of a religious leader,” 
 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/18/gay_rights_the_utah_compromise_is_n
o_model_for_the_nation.html. 
 73 Linsey Bever, Utah—yes, Utah—passes landmark LGBT rights bill, 
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/03/12/utah-legislature-passes-landmark-lgbt-anti-discrimination-bill-
backed-by-mormon-church/?utm_term=.5f2ab1b54930. 
 74 S.B. 296, 60th Gen. Ct. (Utah 2015). 
 75 Utah Code Ann. § 16-61-102 (West). 
 76 Id. 
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and 2) any organization considered to be an affiliate or 
subsidiary of any religious organization and affiliate.77 The 
main difference in the amended text from the original statute 
was the addition of “religious leader” as excluded from the 
definition of “employer.” 
The inclusion of “religious leader” also required the addition 
of its definition to the amended statute. The statute now states 
that a “religious leader” is any individual who “is associated 
with, and is an authorized representative of” a religious 
organization, including members of the clergy and other 
generally recognized types of religious leaders (priest, pastor, 
rabbi, etc.). “Affiliate” is defined as a person who either controls 
or is controlled by another specified person or in this case, by a 
religious organization.78 
Another addition to the statutes increased specific 
protections for religious groups. The text dictating the addition 
of these protections states that employees may express their 
religious beliefs in the workplace as long as it is done in a 
“reasonable, non-disruptive, and non-harassing way” and is on 
equal terms with other similar types of expression of beliefs 
allowed by the employer in the particular workplace. There is 
an exception to this rule if the expression of beliefs would be “in 
direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of 
the employer.”79 
In addition to protecting employees’ specific “right” to 
express their moral beliefs and commitments in the workplace, 
a section of the bill specifically creates protections for 
employees who express their convictions outside of the 
workplace.80 This section states that employers may not fire, 
demote, refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate in relation to 
the employment of individuals based on their “lawful 
expression or expressive activity” which occurs outside of the 
workplace, unless that expression “is in direct conflict with the 
essential business-related interests of the employer.”81 It also 
states that this type of expression includes “convictions about 
marriage, family, or sexuality.”82 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
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The specific language mentioned above is not found in any 
other state statute, and represents the greatest difference 
between the Utah Compromise and legislative actions taken in 
other states in that it not only provided additional protection 
against discrimination based on gender identity and sexual 
orientation, but also increased protection of religious freedom 
and expression. 
In addition to the amended language included in the above 
paragraphs, which were part of bill SB 296, SB 297, introduced 
at the same time and in conjunction with SB 296, included still 
more protections for religious groups.83 The language in SB 297 
is not necessarily relevant to the particular analysis in this 
Note, but it is relevant to understanding what the LDS Church 
and other conservative/religious groups in Utah required in 
exchange for their support of extensions to anti-discrimination 
protections to LGBT individuals.84  
Among other things, SB 297 exempted clergy from 
officiating at weddings, exempted religious organizations from 
providing wedding services, protected conscientious objectors 
from private suits and government penalties, exempted 
religious marriage counseling courses and retreats, allowed 
adoption/foster agencies to maintain existing placement 
policies, required only willing clerks to issue marriage licenses, 
disallowed revocation of professional/business license for 
expression in a nonprofessional setting, and proactively 
protected the character of religious buildings and wedding 
services.85 Much of this legislation had previously been passed 
in a variety of other states, though the requirement that only 
willing clerks must issue marriage licenses had only been 
passed in Delaware. The protections regarding 
professional/business licenses in nonprofessional settings and 
protecting the character of religious buildings and wedding 
services are unique to Utah.86 
The language of the Utah Compromise is unique. It 
increased protection for religious groups and for the LGBT 
community at the same time, though in very different ways. 
From a reading of the language and an analysis of the specific 
 
 83 S.B. 297, 60th Gen. Ct. (Utah 2015). 
 84 Bever, supra, note 73. 
 85 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Summary of the Utah Compromise (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584543. 
 86 Id. 
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protections granted to religious groups and the LGBT 
community, it appears that the Utah Compromise balances the 
burdens and protections placed on both groups. 
2. Criticism of the Utah Compromise 
It is difficult to balance opposing interests and to evaluate 
different procedures for balancing those interests. Many groups 
expressed their support or criticism of the Utah Compromise. 
Both sides offered criticism, but also support, particularly those 
who tended to be more moderate in their approach to these 
particular issues. 
Particularly noteworthy is that the ACLU supported the 
Utah Compromise, despite the sweeping increase in protection 
for religious groups.87 However, it supported only SB 296, 
which it believed was “crafted with the intent of delicately 
balancing the rights of all Utahns to be treated fairly and 
equally in housing and employment with the rights of religious 
organizations to express beliefs.”88 The ACLU did not support 
SB 297, because the ACLU believed it gave far too many 
“protections” to religious groups and individuals at the expense 
of LGBT individuals, and in a way that was fundamentally 
unbalanced.89 In fact, Equality Utah—a prominent LGBT 
advocacy group in Utah—stated that it was not even consulted 
on SB 297, as it was on SB 296.90 Additionally, SB 297 affords 
religious groups and individuals the ability to discriminate on 
any grounds (i.e. not just based on gender identity or sexual 
orientation, but also including race, gender, and all otherwise 
protected classes).91 The ACLU encouraged Utah to reject SB 
297, though it ultimately passed.92 
Additionally, a group of law professors from Brooklyn Law 
School and the University of Virginia Law School wrote an op-
ed piece criticizing the Utah Compromise in its entirety.93 They 
 
 87 ACLU of Utah and Equality Utah Celebrate SB 296, Reject the Harmful 
Provisions of HB 322, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-utah-and-equality-utah-celebrate-sb-296-reject-
harmful-provisions-hb-322?redirect=lgbt-rights-religion-belief/aclu-utah-and-equality-
utah-celebrate-sb-296-reject-harmful-provisions-h. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Tebbe, et al., supra, note 72. 
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pointed out that many groups that withdrew support from 
ENDA after Hobby Lobby—such as the ACLU and other LGBT 
advocacy groups—did so because “it contained broad religious 
exemptions similar to the ones in the Utah law.”94 They 
claimed that this was probably because Utah already had 
significantly fewer anti-discrimination protections in general 
prior to the proposal of the Utah Compromise, and therefore 
the inclusion of gender identity and sexual orientation as 
protected classes in employment and housing seemed like a 
much bigger step than it really was.95 They opined that this 
amendment to the Utah Antidiscrimination Act merely brings 
sexual orientation and gender identity up to the already sub-
par protections given to other classes (such as gender, race, 
etc.) and that because the Utah Compromise only protects 
LGBT individuals in employment and housing, and appears to 
actually increase the protections afforded to religious groups 
and individuals to discriminate against them in any other 
setting, this was a step backward for the LGBT community in 
Utah.96 They concluded by expressing that the Utah 
Compromise was a step in the right direction and will increase 
protections for LGBT individuals to an extent, but it should not 
be considered a foundation or example for other states in 
forming religious freedom and LGBT protection legislation.97  
Unsurprisingly and somewhat ironically, many religious 
leaders in the United States also felt that the protections 
afforded here were not sufficient.98 These religious leaders 
expressed concern over the same issues as the law professors 
mentioned above: the Utah Compromise does not address 
“whether individual business owners, based on their religious 
beliefs, can refuse service to gay people or gay couples—for 
example, a baker who refuses to make a cake for a gay 
wedding.”99 These leaders include Russell Moore, president of 
the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Laurie Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon 
Leaders, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-passes-antidiscrimination-bill-
backed-by-mormon-leaders.html?_r=1. 
 99 Id. 
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Baptist Convention, as well as Roman Catholic Bishops.100 In 
fact, the conclusions drawn are strikingly similar to those of 
the law professors who believed LGBT protections were not 
sufficient, with Dr. Russell Moore concluding that this bill 
should not have been supported or passed, and absolutely 
should not serve as a model going into the future for other 
states or for the nation.101 
These opposing sets of criticisms demonstrate the divide 
that still exists between religious and LGBT advocacy groups, 
but perhaps also indicate that this was an effective 
compromise. It seems that generally both sides were happy 
with what was accomplished, but felt that there was still much 
left unsaid and left to be determined. 
3. Application of the Utah Compromise 
After the passage of the Utah Compromise, there appeared 
to be an impact on Utahns in many different ways. Although 
the question of whether individual business owners could 
refuse to serve individuals based on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity has not yet been answered, there were still 
various positive outcomes that resulted from this legislation. 
While there are not yet any reported claims brought under 
the Compromise, the press has reported the story of a 
transgender woman personally impacted by the law.102 Angie 
Rice, an elementary school teacher, had already gone through 
the male to female transition process, but only openly lived 
that transition at home.103 While she was at school, she had to 
conceal her identity as a female for fear of losing her job as a 
special education teacher.104 After the passage of the Utah 
Compromise, she was then able to be open about her gender 
identity at her workplace and finally felt like she could truly be 
herself in a place where she spent a majority of her day and 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Compromise’s Effect on a Transgender Woman, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Nov. 10 2015, 6:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/utah-compromise-has-both-sides-
seeing-a-way-forward-1447196349; see also Utah’s Complicated “Compromise” on Gay, 
Religious Rights, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 10 2015, 8:09 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/video/utahs-complicated-compromise-on-gay-religious-
rights/88DEAF1A-5C60-45ED-A5DD-9C1FC357BEE4.html. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
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interacted with students and co-workers.105 
The lack of court cases and controversy could most likely be 
construed as a positive outcome of this legislation, as it shows 
that there has generally not been too much public opposition 
against it or a situation that would be considered legally 
dubious. It is likely that there are others, like Rice, who 
previously feared loss of a job or eviction from their homes, who 
were finally able to be open about their sexual orientation 
and/or gender identity while feeling assured that the law was 
protecting them. 
The Utah Compromise increased religious liberties and 
LGBT protections at the same time, which allowed both sides 
to feel more at ease, and hopefully achieved the result of 
creating a less dichotomous society, but one that is supportive 
of rights to live as one chooses and to believe as one wants to 
believe. 
C. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
This Subpart will examine the employment and housing 
anti-discrimination laws in the state of California, also known 
as the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), because 
California has been consistently ahead of the curve in passing 
anti-discrimination legislation, and therefore has much more 
foundation in case law and history to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of FEHA, as compared to other states. First, this 
Subpart will lay out the text of FEHA, then will examine some 
of the support and criticisms of FEHA, and finally will examine 
the case law and other results that have come from the 
enactment of this law. 
1. Language of FEHA 
The earliest version of FEHA passed on September 18, 
1959.106 Then in 1979, California became the second state to 
protect against employment discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in state employment, which then expanded to all 
areas of employment in 1992.107 California became the third 
state to include gender identity as a protected class in all 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 ROBERT D. LINKS, CAL. CIV. PRAC. CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION § 13:5 (2017). 
 107 Id. 
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employment under FEHA in 2003.108 FEHA has also been 
changed and amended over time, particularly in the sections 
discussing religious exemptions. While it has more case law 
than other states, there still is not much in the way of claims 
brought based on religious exemptions alone—even outside the 
scope of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
FEHA begins by stating that it will apply to all employment 
practices, unless they are “based upon a bona fide occupational 
qualification.”109 FEHA then prohibits discrimination based on 
“sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression . . . [and] 
sexual orientation . . . .”110 It then uses very simple language 
within the actual text to explain the grounds for a religious 
exemption, which is simply that the term “‘employer’ does not 
include a religious association or corporation not organized for 
private profit” except as provided elsewhere in the statutory 
definitions.111 
In the definitions section of FEHA, a religious corporation 
is defined as any corporation which was formed as a nonprofit 
or religious nonprofit under the laws of formation of California, 
or any “corporation that is formed primarily or exclusively for 
religious purposes” under the laws of another state “to 
administer the affairs of an organized religious group and that 
is not organized for private profit.”112 Interestingly, it is further 
clarified in the definitions that the term “employer” does 
include a religious corporation when referring to employees of a 
religious corporation who “perform duties, other than religious 
duties, at a health care facility” which is operated by such 
religious corporation “that is not restricted to adherents of the 
religion that established the association or corporation.”113 
Meaning, if a healthcare employer would otherwise be 
considered a religious corporation or association, it does not 
receive an exemption to FEHA if it caters to members outside 
of its own religion and in application to its employees who do 
not serve a religious function. 
This particular definition section of FEHA also states that 
any nonprofit public benefit corporation which is “formed by, or 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940 (West). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926.2 (West). 
 113 Id. 
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affiliated with, a particular religion” and “operates an 
educational institution as its sole or primary activity” is 
permitted to “restrict employment, including promotion, in any 
or all employment categories to individuals of a particular 
religion.”114 Notably, this gives religious educational 
institutions the ability to discriminate on the basis of 
employment, but only in the form of religious discrimination—
not sexual orientation or gender identity. Any other exemptions 
to FEHA, beyond religious discrimination, for religious 
educational institutions must meet the other requirements 
identified above for a “religious corporation.” 
2. Criticism of FEHA 
There are various opinions about whether FEHA is 
providing enough protection to LGBT individuals, and whether 
the construction in FEHA of a religious corporation is too 
narrow to provide sufficient protection for religious groups, 
employers, and individuals. Similar to the Utah Compromise, 
there is criticism from both sides of the spectrum. 
In a law review article featured in the Journal of Catholic 
Legal Studies, the author describes California’s statute as 
defining religious corporations too narrowly.115 While in this 
case she is specifically referring to contraception exemptions, 
the arguments she provides apply in all situations.116 To her, 
firstly, it is an insult to Catholics to narrowly define religious 
institutions and corporations because it ignores the fact that a 
Catholic’s religious beliefs are pervasive in every part of their 
lives.117 She specifically refers to work in hospitals, nursing 
homes, schools, and other public interest entities as being 
religious work for those who identify as Catholic, rather than a 
secular activity.118 She claims that requiring a primary purpose 
of inculcating religious values or beliefs completely separates 
acts of charity, a part of the Catholic faith, from consideration 
as a religious activity worthy of protection.119  
Additionally, her second argument is for the Catholic, the 
 
 114 Id. 
 115 Susan Stabile, When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: Catholic 
Institutions, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137 (2007). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
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definition of a religious corporation—particularly under the 
healthcare exception, the requirement that the institution only 
serve members of their own faith—is of particular concern.120 
Part of the Catholic belief system states that they are to go out 
in the world and “spread the Gospel of Christ.”121 The article’s 
author believes that narrowing the application of the religious 
exemption to only institutions which serve their own 
community ignores that part of their religious mission is to 
create religious institutions which then inculcate Catholicism 
in their employees and those who patronize the institution.122 
In a law review article published in the Boston College 
Journal of Law & Social Science, Erik S. Thompson argues just 
the opposite.123 In fact, he points to the “healthcare exception” 
in FEHA as a perfect example of how religious exemptions 
should be framed on a federal level.124 He points out that this 
protects anyone who identifies as LGBT who works in a 
religious healthcare facility so long as he or she is not acting in 
a pastoral or doctrinal function, and recommends that this be 
extended beyond healthcare to include any other types of 
religious organizations which offer “secular public services, 
including secondary and postsecondary education, 
humanitarian services, and adoption services.”125 
These criticisms demonstrate that there is still room to 
improve protection for both groups, but also that reaching a 
resolution becomes increasingly difficult as legislators get 
closer to a more perfect balance. 
3. Application of FEHA 
There have been several cases brought in light of the 
religious exemption provided by FEHA, though all resulted in a 
ruling for the benefit of the defendant religious corporations, 
rather than the plaintiff. For example, in Bohnert v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop Corporation, a Catholic high school 
teacher brought a claim against the school based on a hostile 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Erik S. Thompson, Compromising Equality: An Analysis of the Religious 
Exemption in the Employment Non-Discrimination Act and its Impact on LGBT 
Workers, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 285 (2015). 
 124 Id. 
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work environment when students took a picture underneath 
her skirt.126 However, she failed to state a claim that the 
religious exemption to FEHA did not apply because she herself 
considered the Catholic high school to be a division of the 
religious organization the Roman Catholic Archbishop 
Corporation under FEHA’s definition of a religious 
corporation.127 Because she did not claim that she was 
employed by a separate non-religious organization or that the 
Roman Catholic Archbishop Corporation was not a religious 
organization, the battle was over before it began.128 
Then in Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Tustin, a preschool teacher brought a claim against the school 
for wrongful termination based on unmarried cohabitation.129 
However, because the church operated the school as part of its 
ministry and the school had no independent legal status apart 
from the church, the preschool was lumped in with the church 
and was considered exempt from FEHA.130 The court once 
again ruled that there was a failure to state a claim.131 
Finally, in Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation, an employee of 
a religiously affiliated hospital brought suit against the 
hospital for attempting to censor her religious speech.132 The 
court held that because the conduct which had occurred in her 
workplace was prior to the addition of the “healthcare 
exception” to the religious exemption as stated above, the 
employer had not been properly put on notice and there was no 
cause of action.133 
There is little in California which demonstrates the actions 
of a plaintiff arguing that a particular employer does not 
qualify for the religious exemption, and even when they have 
done so, they have failed. However, presumably because of 
cases like Silo, California decided to include a specific 
exception to religious exemptions for healthcare institutions, 
which has broadened the protections for those who are 
 
 126 Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 67 F. Supp. 3d 1091 
(N.D. Cal .2014). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Henry v. Red Hill Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tustin, 201 Cal. App. 4th 
1041, 1045 (2011). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 27 Cal. 4th 1097 (2002). 
 133 Id. 
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employees of religiously affiliated employers beyond the typical 
scope of flat state religious exemption laws. Because of this 
healthcare exception, employees who seek to perform secular 
work at a religious institution are afforded the protections 
against discrimination that would be provided in a secular 
workplace, rather than narrower standards of protection that 
are afforded to employees of religious corporations and 
institutions.  
IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF TITLE IX WITH ENDA 
AND STATE STATUTES 
This Note has analyzed the language, criticism, and 
application of Title IX, ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and 
FEHA regarding religious exemptions. While there are twenty 
states—other than Utah and California—which currently have 
employed anti-discrimination laws protecting individuals based 
on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, this Note seeks to 
draw conclusions from ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and 
FEHA as these each respectively represent 1) a culmination of 
work on the federal level; 2) a recent compromise which partly 
appeased both religious and LGBT advocacy groups in a 
culturally conservative state; and 3) a more detailed religious 
exemption requirement enacted in a traditionally progressive 
state. This Part will compare current Title IX regulations with 
ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and FEHA to parse out what 
has been effective and ineffective, and what might be done to 
modify current Title IX regulations to better provide protection 
for religious organizations and LGBT individuals in a way that 
is more fair and equal. 
As stated previously, there are three major problems 
historically with the law and the application of Title IX 
religious exemptions: 1) there is some ambiguity as to whether 
a religious educational institution is entitled to an exemption 
simply by its nature of being a religious educational institution, 
or whether it is within the constitutional rights of OCR to 
require an application or proof of claim prior to granting a 
religious exemption; 2) a “controlling organization” is not really 
required, despite it being a statutory requirement; and 3) an 
explanation of a conflict between specific Title IX provisions 
and specific tenets of the controlling religious organization is 
not really required, nor is there any investigation into the 
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sincerity of the particular tenets put forth by the educational 
institution. This Part will examine each of these problems 
individually and, using ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and 
FEHA as frameworks, will propose specific solutions to solve 
these problems and create a better balance between protection 
of religious educational institutions and LGBT students and 
employees of those institutions. 
A. Claim v. Apply and After-the-Fact Lawsuits 
The first problem this Note seeks to address is the 
ambiguity about “self-executing”: whether religious educational 
institutions are inherently exempt from Title IX requirements 
or whether they must actually apply to receive an exemption. 
Additionally, if they must apply for and be granted an 
exemption, can they do so after a lawsuit has already been filed 
against them? 
In ENDA and FEHA, case law assumed that religious 
employers met the requirements; the burden of proof was on 
the plaintiff to prove that the employer did not meet the 
requirements for the exemption.134 All of this was determined 
in court, after the suit had already been filed, and the religious 
employer could use his or her status under the exemption as a 
reason to move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. There 
were no recorded cases in Nevada, Delaware, or Utah. In the 
cases under FEHA in California, the plaintiffs were never able 
to successfully show that an employer was not entitled to the 
religious exemption. One might argue that this means the law 
is doing its job at protecting the rights of religious employers—
but is it doing it too well and at the expense of individuals who 
suffer unfair discrimination? In fact, one of the main concerns 
of religious groups prior to the passage of ENDA was that case 
load would dramatically increase. This has not occurred. 
If no other anti-discrimination law has required a pre-
emptive application to receive a religious exemption, why 
would OCR have done so with Title IX? While it is not clear 
what the intent of OCR is with regard to the claiming or 
granting of religious exemptions, it is clear that it wanted to 
make the exemption process narrower than in other areas of 
existing law.  
It is also clear that students are a particularly vulnerable 
 
 134 Henry, 201 Cal. App. 4th at 1045. 
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population due to their age. In a law review article titled The 
Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare 
and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children 
of Religious Objectors, James Dwyer argues that almost all 
religious exemptions granted to educational institutions with 
minor students should be revoked in order to promote and 
maintain the basic welfare of children.135  
While college students are generally not minors, they are 
often still dependent on their parents and are at a particularly 
vulnerable and confusing time of their lives. It is possible that 
some students may have been persuaded to attend a religious 
institution by their parents or decided to attend prior to 
recognizing or openly expressing their sexual orientation or 
gender identity. While the intention of OCR is not clear in the 
more stringent process for obtaining religious exemptions in 
the post-secondary setting, perhaps it is safe to assume that it 
is best to broaden those protections to a greater extent than 
those afforded to employees of religious entities. Just because 
in employment law the burden is on the plaintiff to show that a 
religious employer does not qualify for an exemption does not 
mean that same burden should be placed on student plaintiffs. 
 If OCR wants to place this burden on students—as they 
have in all previous suits where the exemption was granted 
after the fact, then: 1) there should be an assumption that a 
religious educational institution is entitled to a religious 
exemption until proven otherwise (therefore negating the 
dispute over claim versus apply) and 2) the qualifications for a 
religious exemption must be clearer and, perhaps, narrower. 
By applying to religious educational institutions the same 
standards that other state anti-discrimination employment 
laws have put into place, religious educational institutions will 
have more certain protection in that they will be presumptively 
exempt. Additionally, with knowledge that a religious 
exemption presumptively exists, LGBT students will be more 
likely to be on notice of the exemption and will be afforded 
better protection overall by the clearer and narrower 
qualifications. 
 
 135 James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child 
Welfare and Education Laws As Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious 
Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996). 
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B. Control Test 
While the existence of a control test is a common element 
among ENDA, the Utah Compromise, and FEHA, as well as 
Title IX, the requirements that must be met to pass the test are 
the vaguest in Title IX. Making the requirements clearer would 
make religious educational institutions more aware of what 
standards they are required to meet and would ensure proper 
compliance. Clearer requirements would also ensure that 
LGBT students are afforded proper protection in situations 
where the religious educational institution they attend should 
not be given a religious exemption under the control test. There 
are two different solutions that could each have a positive 
impact on Title IX, as demonstrated by their various 
applications in existing state law, and could be applied together 
or separately: including a curriculum requirement and/or 
requiring that all students of a religious university belong to 
that particular religion. 
1. Curriculum 
The first solution reflects the language in ENDA and is 
currently in use by Delaware and Nevada state law. It allows 
for religious educational institutions to claim an exemption to 
Title VII if they demonstrate 1) that they are either owned and 
controlled by a religious corporation, or 2) that the curriculum 
of the institution is “directed toward the propagation of a 
particular religion.” As stated previously, there are no recorded 
cases of suits brought in either Delaware or Nevada under 
their versions of this statute. This would serve to replace part 
of the third requirement in the current Title IX control test, 
which requires that a religious educational institution is 
considered controlled by a particular religious educational 
institution if it so states in the charter, or if it is “committed to 
the doctrines of a particular religion, the members of its 
governing body are appointed by the controlling religious 
organization, and it receives a significant amount of financial 
support from the controlling religious organization.” Instead of 
requiring financial support and appointment of the governing 
body by the controlling religious organizations, the 
requirement would simply be that the curriculum of the 
religious educational institution propagate a particular 
religion. This would clarify the requirements for religious 
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educational institutions which are non-denominational and are 
not affiliated with a particular official church entity, but do 
espouse particular religious beliefs in their actual curriculum. 
This first solution would substantially broaden the ability 
of religious educational institutions to receive religious 
exemptions, though not more so than they have received 
historically, and would also clarify the requirements so that 
OCR could continue to recognize exemptions for such schools 
without violating the language of the Title IX control test. 
2. Church member requirement 
The second solution would require that all students and 
employees at a particular religious educational institution 
either belong to the controlling religious organization or 
subscribe to the belief system based on the curriculum of the 
religious educational institution. As stated above, FEHA 
already has an exception for religious exemptions for religious 
healthcare facilities. This exception requires that the employer 
abide by FEHA and precludes religious exemptions for any 
employees not in a ministerial role, unless the religious 
healthcare facility requires that its patients and staff adhere to 
the particular religious beliefs of the healthcare facility or its 
controlling religious corporation. Thompson, in his law review 
article mentioned above, argued that the extension of this 
healthcare exception should apply to all religious public 
interest institutions, including educational institutions, when 
the institution is providing a secular service, and that this also 
be included in ENDA. The contrasting opinion from the 
Catholic Law Review article states that although the desire to 
work in healthcare and perform other types of public service 
can often stem from one’s religious beliefs, it does not 
necessarily mean that the government should extend the right 
to discriminate to any type of public interest institution that 
performs secular work and happens to house employees who 
have chosen that particular profession based on their religious 
or moral values. This would lead to a system based on religious 
versus secular motivations of employers and employees, rather 
than a system based on clearly identifiable religious versus 
secular work and organizations, and would completely erode 
any ability for the government to distinguish between who 
deserves protection and who does not. 
While the Title IX control test allows religious educational 
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institutions to claim a religious exemption based on the fact 
that it “requires its faculty, students or employees to be 
members of or otherwise espouse a personal belief in, the 
religion of the [controlling] organization,” this is only one of 
three ways to obtain a religious exemption. There are then two 
different ways to apply this solution. The first would be to 
make this a blanket requirement under the control test in 
order to obtain a religious exemption; the educational 
institution must require its students and employees to adhere 
to a particular religious belief system.  
Or, this could be applied in conjunction with the first 
solution proposed. The language could be changed to reflect 
three different options: a requirement that 1) the school is an 
institution or department of divinity, 2) the charter states that 
the institution is controlled by a specific religious organization, 
or 3) the curriculum of the educational institution is directed 
towards the propagation of a particular religion or belief 
system and requires its students and employees to be members 
of that religion or adhere to that belief system. This would still 
allow for the inclusion of schools which are not controlled by a 
specific religious organization, but would require these schools 
to limit their students and employees to adherents of the belief 
system propagated by the curriculum. This would then also 
extend protection to students who attend religious educational 
institutions that are not controlled by a particular religious 
organization and do not require its students to adhere to a 
particular religion. This solution would be more likely to 
encourage religious educational institutions that are truly 
propagating a particular religious belief system to come into 
compliance, while those who are not so committed to a 
particular religion or belief system would no longer be able to 
discriminate against LGBT individuals. 
C. Conflict with Tenets and Investigation of Sincerity 
The third problem left to be solved in the Title IX 
regulations is the requirement that a religious educational 
institution specify which parts of Title IX it would like to be 
exempted from and which particular tenets of its religion Title 
IX is in conflict with. Similar to the issue in Subpart A, 
whether an exemption should be claimed or applied for, there is 
no particular requirement under ENDA, the Utah 
Compromise, or FEHA which allows for only certain parts of 
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the religious exemptions to apply to certain types of 
discrimination (when looking at sex, gender, gender identity, 
and sexual orientation). It functions generally as a blanket 
exemption from all discrimination claims as long as a religious 
employer meets the religious exemption test. 
There are, however, often cases where the sincerity of the 
institution’s particular religious beliefs comes into question. 
When determining whether particular tenets of a religion are 
in conflict with particular requirements of Title IX, it is 
essential to look into the sincerity of the institution’s belief and 
adherence to a tenet it is claiming is in conflict with the Title 
IX requirement. 
In a Stanford Law Review article discussing the 
constitutional limits of investigating the sincerity of religious 
beliefs, Ben Adams and Cynthia Barmore explain that there is 
some room for courts to look into the sincerity of beliefs in two 
circumstances: 1) to see if there is a motive to make an 
insincere claim of belief, and 2) to see if the claimant’s behavior 
is contradictory to the claim made and therefore would 
constitute fraud.136 As mentioned previously, there was never 
any sort of action on the part of OCR to determine if the tenets 
offered up as contradictory to Title IX requirements were really 
the tenets subscribed to by the educational institution. If it was 
assumed that religious educational institutions are entitled to 
a religious exemption, this would remove any need for OCR to 
investigate any insincerity in the claims of these educational 
institutions, or to investigate anything at all. However, if a 
student or employee of a religious educational institution 
brings a suit, it would be entirely appropriate for the plaintiff 
to make a claim that the way in which he or she had been 
discriminated against was not contradictory to the tenets of the 
educational institution (if they in fact conceded that the 
educational institution met the requirements of the control 
test). 
However, these religious tenets should be mandatory in the 
particular religion of the religious educational institution in 
order to qualify. For example in a FEHA case, a Jehovah’s 
Witness brought suit against his employer for wrongful 
termination when he skipped work to attend a religious 
 
 136 Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts 
After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014). 
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conference.137 The employer attempted to use the fact that this 
was not a mandatory religious requirement and that the 
employee had skipped the conference the previous year as 
evidence that the claim was based on an insincere religious 
belief.138 The plaintiff won the suit, however, as the court held 
that a religious act need not be mandatory for it be sincere.139 
This type of thinking about sincerity of religious belief opens 
the door to a religious educational institution claiming any sort 
of belief, even if it is simply a guideline or cultural religious 
belief. Having a requirement that the particular tenet be a 
permanent and mandatory part of a religious belief system 
affords better protection for LGBT individuals and provides 
clearer guidelines for religious educational institutions. In fact, 
if the second solution offered in Subpart B—that any religious 
educational institution which is entitled to an exemption must 
require that its students and employees adhere to a particular 
religion or belief system—was required in every religious 
educational institution, then this requirement that a religious 
tenet be mandatory in a particular religion would make even 
more sense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These solutions seek to create a better balance of protection 
for religious educational institutions and LGBT students and 
employees of these institutions. There would likely be 
arguments on both sides about why protections are too limited 
for both groups, but this is where the Utah Compromise has 
perhaps offered one of the most effective ways to deal with this 
problem. While it might appear that religious educational 
institutions are constrained in their ability to discriminate, 
perhaps an additional solution is one in which religious 
students and employees are offered more protection at secular 
institutions. This was what the Utah Compromise sought to 
accomplish: while legislators might somewhat limit the 
abilities of employers to discriminate, they are going to liberate 
the individual. This is exactly what is proposed by this Note: 
that the government narrow protections on large organizations 
 
 137 California Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n v. Gemini Aluminum Corp., 
122 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1011 (2004). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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and improve protections for individuals—whether that be 
based on sexual orientation discrimination or religious 
discrimination. 
In fact, the greatest example of this concept from the Utah 
Compromise was when the LDS Church and LGBT advocacy 
groups counseled together with legislators in order to try and 
reach a fair compromise on SB 296. This cooperation was more 
unique than the language of the law itself, or even its 
application. If religious institutions of higher education could 
come together with LGBT advocacy groups and with OCR and 
other federal legislators and come to a resolution to balance 
protections for religious educational institutions and LGBT 
individuals, then maybe a new law and process used by OCR to 
enforce Title IX could be agreed upon in a way that will create 
the best possible balance of protection for everyone. 
Based on an analysis of Title IX, ENDA, the Utah 
Compromise, and FEHA, the resolution that works best for 
everyone might exist in the form of the solution proposed in 
this Note. First, the debate over whether religious institutions 
claim or apply for exemptions would finally come to a close; 
religious exemptions would be assumed until proven otherwise 
by a plaintiff. Second, the control test would be clarified; 
religious educational institutions may now use a curriculum 
directed toward the propagation of a particular religion as 
sufficient for qualifying for an exemption, however these 
institutions must require that all students adhere to the 
religious belief system of the institution. Third, religious 
educational institutions would still be expected to discriminate 
only based on certain parts of Title IX and only if it truly 
conflicted with a particular mandatory tenet espoused by the 
controlling religious organization or curriculum. 
This solution both broadens and narrows the protections for 
religious educational institutions and LGBT individuals, but 
most importantly it clarifies the requirements for religious 
exemptions to Title IX so that both institutions and individuals 
might better be able to claim the rights and protections that 
are afforded to them. 
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